We analyze how China's emergence as a destination for foreign direct investment is affecting the ability of other countries to attract FDI. We do so using an approach that accounts for the endogeneity of China's FDI. The impact turns out to vary by region. China's rapid growth and attractions as a destination for FDI also encourages FDI flows to other Asian countries, as if producers in these economies belong to a common supply chain. There is also evidence of FDI diversion from OECD recipients. We interpret this in terms of FDI motivated by the desire to produce close to the market where the final sale takes place. For whatever reason limits on their ability to raise finance for investment in multiple markets or limits on their ability to control operations in diverse locations firms more inclined to invest in China for this reason are corresponding less inclined to invest in the OECD. A detailed analysis of Japanese foreign direct investment outflows disaggregated by sector further supports these conclusions.
Introduction
China's emergence has been perhaps the single most important new development affecting the world economy at the outset of the 21 st century. By some estimates the country contributed more than a quarter of the growth of global GDP in recent years. 2 It is the world's sixth larger trader, supplying more than 6 per cent of global exports. It is a leading destination for foreign direct investment by producers seeking to capitalize on its large domestic market and low labor costs. (See Figure 1 .) It has become sufficiently consequential that, for a period in the autumn of 1994, the question of whether the Chinese economy was overheating was the number one issue for forecasters of global growth.
Much of this attention has focused on how China is affecting the advanced economies. There has been discussion for example of whether a revaluation of the renminbi would lead to a general revaluation of Asian currencies against the dollar and narrow the U.S. trade deficit. There are complaints in Europe that China's reluctance to let its currency to rise has caused the dollar's decline to be disproportionately concentrated on the euro-dollar rate. 3 There are worries in Japan and Korea that the rapid 1 University of California, Berkeley and Bank of England, respectively. None of the views expressed here are necessarily those of the Bank of England. We thank Julian di Giovanni and seminar participants at the Bank of England for helpful comments. 2 When GDP is measured at purchasing power parity. 3 See for example the report in Agence France Presse (2004) .
growth of Chinese industry, fed by foreign direct investment from these and other countries, is "hollowing out" their manufacturing sectors. 4 But China's impact on developing countries is equally profound. As an exporter of labor-intensive manufactures, China competes with other developing countries with a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured goods. In the developing world there is trepidation that, with 200 million to 300 million underemployed rural Chinese still to be integrated into the modern manufacturing sector, the impact has only begun to be felt. 5 As a magnet for foreign investment, China has allegedly made it more difficult for other emerging markets to attract FDI. Thus, when FDI inflows into the Mexican maquiladora sector dropped from $3 billion in 2000 to $2 billion in 2003, there was a tendency to blame the emergence of China as a more attractive low-cost production and export platform. But China is also a growing market for the exports of other countries. It is currently the fastest growing foreign market for countries like Brazil that are major exporters of raw materials. 8 Chinese companies are integrated into global supply chains, assembling components produced in other parts of the world and producing components 4 Lincoln (2002) provides discussion and analysis. 5 At the end of 2004 these fears were highlighted by the impending expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement, by which the growth of China's textile and apparel exports had been constrained. There is also the urban legend that more sombreros are now manufactured in China than in Mexico. 6 Thus, United Nations (2004, p.61) concludes that "the relocation of FDI from the maquila industries had mainly been caused by competition from Asia. One third of all enterprises that have left are reported to have moved to China…" 7 Straits Times (21 September 2002), quoted in McKibbin and Woo (2003) , p.14. 8 See for example the report in Lapper (2004) .
and materials that are assembled and finished in other countries. Thus, the growth of capacity and demand in China, rather than making other developing countries less attractive as platforms for production, could make them more attractive to the extent that they succeed in producing for the Chinese market and integrating into the same supply chains.
The point applies also to FDI. To reap the full benefits of building assembly plants in China, firms may also need to invest in component production in Singapore or
Malaysia. The increase of FDI in China may thus encourage additional FDI in other countries rather than crowding it out.
To date, analysis of these issues has focused mainly on export competition and Asia. Yang and Vines (2000) simulate a multi-sector, multi-country model with differentiated products as a way of analyzing the impact of China on exports from other Asian countries, finding that ASEAN's exports drop slightly while those of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong rise. Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler (2003) regress the growth of other Asian countries' exports on China's exports (and various controls) but find only a weak correlation. Our own take (Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong 2004 ) uses the gravity model augmented to include a role for China's exports. While we find a tendency for China's exports to third markets to crowd out the exports of other Asian countries, this effect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods and hence by less-developed Asian countries that export those products, not in markets for capital goods or by the more advanced Asian economies for which machinery and equipment comprise a significant fraction of total exports. At the same time, there has been a tendency for a rapidly growing China to suck up imports from its Asian neighbors. The framework for our analysis is the gravity model of bilateral flows but used here to analyze foreign direct investment rather than trade. In addition to the standard gravity-model variables -inter alia, the size of the source and destination countries and the distance between them -we augment the specification to include also Chinese FDI receipts from the same source country. The identification strategy -using the distance between China and the source country as an instrument for Chinese FDI receipts -is also the same as in that previous study. And, as in our previous analysis of exports, our results for FDI are somewhat surprising.
offset by strengthening their ability to absorb new foreign technologies and engaging in indigenous technical innovations. Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso (2004, p.30) observe that FDI into Mexico declined by 30 per cent between 2002 and 2003, FDI into Brazil by 52 per cent, while FDI flows into China were soaring -a fact they attribute to "the prospect of a huge domestic market of 1.3 billion consumers…" They worry that this will slow technology transfer and industrialization, as Latin America reverts to being an exporter of primary commodities. But they do not first test for FDI diversion. There is also an interesting related study by Blonigen, Davies, Waddell and Naughton (2004) that uses spatial econometric techniques to analyze the spatial correlation of FDI to alternative (neighboring regions). However, their data is limited to OECD countries, and their method could not be used to answer our question without further adaptation.
Foreign Direct Investment since 1990
Since the early 1990s, China has become a major destination for foreign direct competitive." This is the issue we address in the remainder of this paper.
Data and Methodology
The data for our study are drawn mainly from the OECD. 20 The OECD defines FDI as international investment by a resident entity in one country (the direct investor)
with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in a country other than that of the investor (the direct investment enterprise). 21 It provides data for FDI flows, disaggregated by destination, for 29 source countries (the principal European countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey).
It breaks down outflows from these countries, by destination, distinguishing 60 OECD and non-OECD recipients. To broaden our coverage of FDI flows in Asia, where the largest impact may be felt, we added data on FDI inflows from national sources for 19 See the citations in Wong and Adams (2002) , p.13. 20 "Source OECD" at http://www.sourceoecd.org. 21 As described in the glossary to Source OECD, "Lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated."
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam (information on which is not included in the OECD data base). We focus on the period starting in 1988, since China only became an important destination for FDI from the early 1990s.
The OECD provides FDI in source-country currency. We convert it into millions of U.S. dollars and then deflate it by the U.S. CPI for urban consumers. Real GDP and GDP per capita in constant 1995 U.S. dollars are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Other country-specific variables, such as land area and language, are from Rose (2002), as is the distance variable. See Appendix 1 for further details.
The framework for our analysis is the familiar workhorse of the empirical international economics, the gravity model, where the log of FDI is related to on measures of the economic size of the source and destination countries and the distance between them. We consider bilateral flows between all 29 source and 63 destination countries. 22 We regress the log of FDI by country i in country j (say, of Japan in Mexico)
on their log GDPs, their log per capita GDPs, the distance between them, and the other now-standard gravity model arguments (combined land area, land lockedness, number of islands, common language, common colonizer, whether the countries in question were ever in a colonial relationship). Our innovation is to include a measure of China's FDI receipts from the same source country (in the present example, Japan). We model 22 With provision for observations dropped due to missing variables. When the data point is not missing but zero FDI is recorded between a pair of countries (as is the case with about 15 per cent of our non-missing observations), it is not clear how to treat this observation, especially since the log of zero is undefined. Conventional practice in the gravity model literature is to replace the zero observations with the minimum of the log of positive values in the sample (in the present case, -7). We proceed in this manner here. Alternatively, one could simply drop these observations, but this might be a source of truncation bias. In practice, we find very similar results when dropping the zero observations and setting them to -7. Similarly, studies like Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) that have used Tobit and similar methods to adjust for the possibility of truncation in the context of trade tend to find that the impact on the estimated coefficients is minimal.
separately China's own FDI receipts and the FDI receipts of other countries using this same framework.
The benchmark specification does not include country-pair fixed effects, which authors like Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) While the gravity model has been widely used in studies of trade, its application to bilateral FDI flows is less common. However, a number of earlier studies have shown that the gravity model also has explanatory power when applied to foreign direct investment. This is not surprising: larger countries have more companies with the resources to invest abroad and are more likely to attract FDI; similarly, to the extent that distance proxies for information as well as transportation costs, countries located at a greater distance are less likely to engage in bilateral FDI. An early study by Grubert and 23 Adding country-pair fixed effects would also require us to drop common language, land lockedness, number of islands, common land border, and common colonizer. Below we show what happens when we replace these variables with country-pair fixed effects. 24 The index runs from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating lower risk. It tends to vary significantly over time for emerging markets but less for advanced countries. As for China itself, between 1990 and 2002, the period covered here, the index varies from 56 to 75. Mutti (1991) reasons for thinking that China's FDI-(and export-) led growth model involves causality running from FDI inflows to GDP as well as the other way around, it is less obvious that China's aggregate GDP is affected by its FDI from an individual source country. In practice, our results are essentially the same when we drop Chinese GDP from the instrument list, although the coefficient estimates are slightly less precise. This is reassuring, since when we include time fixed effects, as we do in the benchmark estimates, China's GDP must be dropped from the instrument list since it is perfectly correlated with the vector of period dummies. 26 When we use all three instrumental variables (distance from China, China's GDP, and China's political risk), the coefficient capturing the impact of Chinese FDI inflows on other countries' FDI receipts enters with a coefficient of -0.08 with a standard error of 0.03. Evidently, opting instead for the vector of time dummies leads to a smaller impact (where smaller means in absolute value terms), the analogous
Basic Results
In Table 2 we report the second stage estimates. We provide OLS estimates for comparison, which shows how much difference is made by the instrumental variables.
The basic gravity variables enter as expected. Larger countries send and receive more FDI. Higher labor costs in the originating country and lower labor costs in the destination (as captured by per capita GDP) are associated with larger FDI flows.
Distance between the sending and receiving countries has a negative impact, while common language, common land border, common colonizer, past colonial relationship, access to sea lanes, and the existence of a currency union all have a positive impact. Our time-varying measure of institutional quality enters positively for both the sending and receiving countries. This makes sense, since higher values of this variable imply lower risk.
The key coefficient for present purposes is that on Chinese FDI. In the instrumental-variables regressions, the coefficient on this variable is negative but not significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. (Here and throughout we report robust standard errors that correct for heteroscedasticity.) When we exclude the time fixed effects (in estimates not reported in Thus, the weak negative coefficient obtained for the full sample is driven by the only remaining country grouping, the OECD. This result appears to be robust; it is not 27 Not surprisingly, since FDI in China and FDI in other countries tend to be affected by the same trends in globalization and shifts in investor sentiment. Note that this is the same result that we found in our previous paper for exports: Chinese exports had a tendency to crowd out other countries' exports when the distance between China and its final market was used as an instrument, but Chinese exports and other countries' exports were positively correlated when ordinary least squares was used. 28 It turns out that the positive coefficient on China's FDI in the equations for Central and Eastern Europe is driven by the observations for one country, Hungary. Deleting the observations for Hungary renders the coefficient on China's FDI insignificantly different from zero; in contrast, deleting the observations for other Central and Eastern European countries one by one has no impact on the results. (The other members of this region for which we have observations are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine.) It appears that this effect is driven by the observations for 1993-95, when Hungary engaged in a burst of privatization transactions and China was simultaneously opening to foreign flows. In other words, there may be reason to worry that this particular correlation is spurious.
obviously driven by the observations for any one OECD economy. 29 An interpretation is that in some cases, notably those involving OECD countries, competition for FDI is driven not merely by relative costs of production but also by market-size considerations.
Automobile producers, for example, when considering in which countries to undertake FDI, take into account the advantages of producing close to the final market both for tariff-jumping reasons and in order to be able to better tailor their product mix to local demand. The interest of motor-vehicle producers to get into China in order to tap that country's growing demand for their products, which has been much discussed since the early 1990s, is a case in point. To be sure, for this desire to set up production facilities in China to discourage investment in additional plant in other markets, there must be an added element. There must be limits on the ability of headquarters to efficiently control overseas facilities in a proliferation of different locations, for example, or increasing costs of external finance. Our results suggest that one or another of these considerations has been operating in the present context.
Robustness Checks
We performed number of sensitivity analyses of the robustness of these results. We also added a measure of bilateral exchange rate variability (defined as the coefficient of variation of monthly average changes in the bilateral exchange rate over the 30 These variables were coded from the standard IMF source by Nancy Brune, to whom we are grateful for sharing her data. 31 The one difference is that the positive coefficient on Latin American FDI receipts is now larger (at 0.64) and significantly different from zero (with a t-statistic of 2.79). Unfortunately, the partial coverage of our controls variables forces us to drop the observations for Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, leaving only Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The first three countries are all cases where China's FDI-fueled growth has been cited as a factor encouraging foreign investment in their primary-producing sectors. Thus, it is hard to be confident that this result reflects the greater impact of Chinese growth on the attractions of investment in their primary producing sectors or simply the smaller sample. 33 This is in contrast to some results on FDI in Rose (2003) . We continue to obtain the same result reported in the text when we drop China's FDI from the list of explanation variables and estimate the determinants of inflows using country-pair fixed and random effect. Note, however, that our sample is somewhat different, and, perhaps more importantly, Rose defines his observations and dependent variable differently, aggregating the FDI flows to and from each country pair.
Including both log GDP and the country-pair dummies as explanatory variables produces a value for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in excess of 200, well above the critical cut-off point of 30 used in multicolinearity tests. And when we include the log GDPs, country-pair dummies and fitted value of China's FDI as explanatory variables, the VIF reaches 1,000. Given the choice between including measures of country size or countrypair fixed effects, we are inclined toward the former, since this helps us to pick up variation over time -which is in essence the subject of this paper.
Further Disaggregation by Recipient and Provider
We now look more closely at which countries are driving the results -and which countries are responsible for the positive effect of China's FDI receipts on the FDI receipts of other Asian countries in particular. To this end, we rerun the same specification for the subsample of Asian countries but allow the coefficient on the fitted value of China's FDI inflows to differ for each Asian FDI recipient. The results are in Table 4 . We obtain significantly positive coefficients for all Asian countries. The largest coefficients are for Japan and Singapore, two important producers of capital goods and electronic components used in Chinese manufacturing, and for Indonesia, a heavy supplier of raw materials and energy to China. Interestingly, the smallest coefficients are for Korea, where warnings of the "hollowing out" of domestic industry by China's growth and fears of FDI diversion are pervasive, and Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Asian countries whose supply-chain links with China are relatively minimal.
34 Table 5 provides evidence on which FDI providers are mainly responsible for the positive coefficients on China's FDI for other Asian FDI recipients. We obtain positive effects across the board, suggesting that firms in all OECD countries regard FDI in China and FDI in other Asian countries as complements rather than substitutes. The largest absolute impact is due to Japan, because the value of Japanese FDI in China (and other Asian countries) is far larger than FDI in Asia by other OECD source countries.
A Closer Look at Japanese FDI
The preceding results suggest that China's emergence may be particularly important for the direction of FDI flows, in terms of absolute magnitude, in the case of Japan. In this section we therefore examine that country's foreign direct investment flows in more detail. We first disaggregate Japanese FDI by individual Asian recipient country. That is, limiting the sample of FDI recipients to Asian countries (as in Table 5 ),
we not only allow the coefficient on China's fitted FDI inflows to differ between Japan and other source countries, but we allow the Japanese outflow effect to be different for each Asian recipient of Japanese FDI.
The results are shown in Table 6 what we found for Korea in Table 4 above.
Another way of gaining insight into the redirection of Japanese FDI outflows is to disaggregate them by sector as well as region. Table 7 Japan's sector-specific FDI in China and its sector-specific FDI in other countries.
36
The results are consistent with those obtained from our gravity-model analysis.
There is a positive correlation between Japanese FDI flows to China and Japanese FDI flows to other Asia whether we consider manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, or total FDI. This is the same complementarity that we observed using the gravity model above.
Looking at individual sectors, the only exceptions are food processing, chemicals, construction, trade, and finance and insurance.
For Latin America, we obtain the same weak negative correlation as in the gravity-model analysis. Again, this is evident for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing and total FDI alike. In Central and Eastern Europe, where we obtained a positive coefficient in the gravity-model analysis, we again see positive correlations for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, and total Japanese FDI. The positive correlation for manufacturing seems heavily driven by electrical machinery/electronics and motor vehicles/transport 35 Thus, from our results it would appear that the hollowing-out phenomenon in Korea reflects not so much the diversion of Korea's own investment toward China as the diversion of inward investment toward lowerlabor-cost economies. 36 Since we have only 15 time series observations for each region, a more sophisticated econometric analysis does not seem justified. All values are expressed in real U.S. dollars (yen values are first converted by the yen/dollar exchange rate and then deflated by the U.S. price index).
equipment. We suspect that this correlation is spurious, as argued above. 37 The positive correlation for non-manufacturing investment is primarily driven by minerals and mining and by real estate. (In the case of mining it is important to observe that our data for Eastern Europe include Russia as an inflow country.) Again, we suspect that this is correlation, not causation, as argued above.
The last column of Table 7 considers the correlation between Japanese FDI in China and Japanese FDI in OECD countries. 38 Our surprising result above was the finding of significant diversion of Japanese FDI away from OECD destinations as Japanese FDI in China expanded. The same correlation is evident here in the sectoral results. There is a negative correlation between Japanese FDI in China and Japanese FDI in the OECD for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, and the total alike, although it is small in the case of nonmanufacturing sectors. The correlation is negative for six of the eight manufacturing industries; the exceptions are textiles (where the effect is essentially zero) and chemicals. The effects are more heterogeneous in the case of nonmanufacturing sectors -not surprisingly given the existence of only a very small negative correlation for nonmanufacturing industries overall.
Overall, our aggregate results receive further support from this disaggregated analysis. Japanese FDI in China and Japanese FDI in other Asian countries appear to be complements rather than substitutes, although the same happy outcome may not obtain in each and every industry; for example, producers of processed foods and chemicals are not likely to be so favored. To the extent that China's emergence results in FDI diversion, it 37 The correlation reflects the fact that Japanese firms were separately increasing their capacity in these manufacturing industries in both China and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and the early part of the present decade, not that Eastern Europe and China were part of an integrated supply chain. 38 Bear in mind that, as above, Mexico and South Korea are excluded from the OECD for purposes of this analysis.
appears to mainly be the OECD countries that suffer. We interpret in terms of the domestic-market effect. Japanese firms that would have invested in the OECD in order to be able to produce close to and sell into its large market are increasingly attracted to China for essentially the same reasons. Limits on their ability to finance and control operations in geographically diverse markets have thus led to some crowding out of Japanese FDI in the OECD in favor of Japanese FDI in China.
Conclusions
There has been considerable recent discussion of the possibility that China's emergence as a destination for investment has diverted FDI receipts from other countries, Asian countries in particular. In this paper we analyzed this possibility using both aggregated and disaggregated data. The aggregate analysis employing bilateral FDI flows from OECD sources to OECD and non-OECD destinations does not indicate FDI diversion from other Asian countries. If anything, there is some evidence that developments making China a more attractive destination for FDI also make other Asian countries more attractive destinations for FDI, as would be the case if China and these other economies are part of the same global production networks. Japanese firms, it appears from our results, are among the leaders in attempting to exploit these complementarities.
On the other hand there is some evidence of FDI diversion from OECD recipients.
We interpret this in terms of FDI motivated by the desire to produce close to the market where the final sale takes place. For whatever reason -limits on their ability to raise finance for investment in multiple markets or limits on their ability to control operations in diverse locations -firms more inclined to invest in China for this reason are corresponding less inclined to invest in the OECD. Again, it appears that Japanese firms are among the leaders in redirecting their foreign investment in this way.
These findings then led us to examine Japanese FDI in China and other regions at the sectoral level. The sectoral patterns confirm the aggregate analysis. Japanese FDI flows to China and other Asian countries tend to be positively, not negatively, correlated.
The main exceptions in the case of manufacturing are food processing and chemicals, where supply-chain linkages are plausibly less prominent than in, say, consumer electronics.
From the perspective of FDI diversion, then, China's rise is both good and bad news. It is good news for Asia, although it may not be such good news for individuals who depend for their livelihoods on the food-processing and chemicals industries, which are receiving less foreign investment as a result of Chinese competition. On the other hand, China's rise may be bad news in this respect for OECD countries and their manufacturing sectors in particular.
As we found in our previous paper on trade, blanket statements concerning China's impact are not particularly supportable. The country's emergence is a mixed blessing requiring a nuanced analysis. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
